When differentiating body and soul and placing to oquerer as attribute of the thought and as ' ' passion of alma' ' , Discardings are to adefinir as the soul and the spirit participates of what it is voluntary eintencional in the man. The spirit, cannot be divided e, in turn, it has acapacidade to divide the body in parts. ' ' Therefore, with effect, when I consider my spirit, isto, I myself, in the measure where I am only one thing that thinks, not poso to adistinguir parts some, but I conceive myself as an entire thing only e. E, conquanto, the spirit all seems to be joined to the body all, however a foot, umbrao or any another part being separate of my body, are certain that nempor this will have something there of deducted my spirit. the facultieses of wanting, feeling, to conceive, etc., cannot properly be called its parts: therefore omesmo spirit is used all in also wanting and all in feeling, in conceiving, etc.

but accurately occurs the opposite with the corporal or extensive things: therefore he does not have one at least that I do not make easily in pieces for my thought, that my spirit does not divide mui in many parts easily and, therefore, that I do not recognize to be divisvel' ' (Discardings, 1983: p 139) This is basically the way as the philosophical rationalism, concebidoaqui from ' ' first moderno' ' in the scope of the philosophy, it faced and concebeuas motivations and uncurling of human acting. Although such chain has nosalertado definitively to reflect on the autoconscincia and same opensamento, on ' ' I Penso' ' , on the other hand it initiated a series decrticas to the college to think that benvolas of the rationalism culminated in a philosophical position dedesiluso of the pretensions. In century XIX, agrandes was common thinking the diffidence in relation when thinking.